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The court further pointed out, consistently with earlier Ohio de-
cisions, that the ordinance was invalid as a stop-gap ordinance to pre-
serve the status quo pending the adoption of a comprehensive zoning
ordinance. State ex rel. v. Guion, 117 Ohio St. 327, 158 N.E. 748
(1927); State ex rel. v. Kruezweiser, 12o Ohio St. 352, 166 N.E.
228 (1929). A number of jurisdictions look more favorably upon such
emergency measures. Downham v. City Council of Aexandria, 58 Fed.
(2d) 784 (1932); Lima v. Woodruff, 107 Cal. App. 285, 290 Pac.
480 (1930).
The crux of the whole problem is the extent to which regulation
under the police power can be carried before it ceases to be regulation
and reaches the point of confiscation without compensation. It is essen-
tially a question of degree and a balancing of public and private interests.
While it may at first seem startling that such a hazard to life cannot be
removed in the manner attempted, the case is sound from the viewpoint
of precedent.
Jo-N G. SARBER
CRIMINAL LAW
EXTRADITION - INSANITY AS A BAR TO
The Ohio Legislature, during its last session, adopted the Uniform
Criminal Extradition Act (Ohio G.C. sec. 109-1 to 109-31) which
became effective August 20, 1937. The first case decided under the
new Act involved a request by the State of Georgia for the return of an
alleged fugitive who had committed arson in that state and fled from
justice, seeking asylum in Ohio. At the hearing before the Governor,
the request for extradition was honored, and a warrant issued for the
rendition of the alleged fugitive. A writ of habeas corpus on behalf of
the accused issued out of the court of common pleas, and at the hearing
of the cause it was shown that a lunacy inquest concerning his mental
capacity was then pending. The court found that it was improper to
proceed with the extradition so long as the lunacy proceedings existed.
A writ of procedendo on the relation of the Governor then issued in
the Supreme Court compelling the court of common pleas to proceed
to judgment in the habeas corpus proceedings notwithstanding the
pendency of the lunacy inquest. The State, ex rel., Davey, Governor,
et al. v. Owen, Judge, et al., 133 Ohio St. 96, 1o Ohio 0. 102, 12
N.E. (2d) 144 (1937). This raises the interesting question, "Suppose
the alleged fugitive were so insane as to be unable to understand the
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nature of the extradition proceedings, and to take advantage of his
right, under the present Act, to habeas corpus?"
Ohio has held that in the trial of a criminal indictment it must appear
that the accused has sufficient reason and presence of mind to properly
inform his counsel of matters pertaining to his defense, to be advised by
them, to aid in the selection of the jury, and to comprehend the details
of the evidence; and if any of these details be missing, a defense of
insanity has been made out. State v. Rieber, 51 Ohio Law Bull. 208
(i9o6). And the jury in such a case is expected to inquire into the
present sanity or insanity of the accused concerning these matters,
without regard for the mental condition of the accused at the time of
the commission of the alleged act. State v. Terziliger, 54 Ohio Law
Bull. 205, 6 Ohio Law Rep. 588 (1908).
By section 13441-1 of the General Code, it is provided that where
a suggestion of the insanity of the accused is made by counsel, or notice
of this fact is otherwise conveyed to the court, he shall proceed to a
determination of that issue before proceeding with the trial of the indict-
ment. This section was held to be mandatory in Evans v. State, 123
Ohio St. 132, 174 N.E. 348 (193o) at page 140, where the Court,
speaking through Judge Allen, says, " * * * hence the accused is
assured of an inquiry into his mental condition, not at the discretion of
the court, but as a matter of right."
In the extradition proceedings involved in The State, ex rel., Davey,
Governor, et al. v. Owen, et al., supra, however, the court was basing
its decision on sound authority when it ordered the habeas corpus hear-
ing to proceed to final judgment regardless of the lunacy proceeding
which was pending. In that case, the court relied in part on the case
of Charlton v. Kelly, Sheriff, 229 U.S. 447, 57 L. Ed. 1274, 33 Sup.
Ct. 945 (1912), which is a leading authority in the field, and in which
the Supreme Court of the United States said, through Mr. Justice
Lurton: "We therefore conclude that the examining magistrate did not
exceed his authority in excluding evidence of insanity. If the evidence
was only for the purpose of showing present insanity by reason of which
the accused was not capable of defending the charge of crime, it is an
objection which should be taken before or at the time of his trial for
the crime, and heard by the court having jurisdiction of the crime." In
view of the usual procedure adopted in cases where the sanity of the
accused is questioned, it would appear that this rule applied in extradition
proceedings would constitute an anomaly in the law of criminal pro-
cedure.
At this point it would be well to inquire into the nature and technique
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of extradition in order to determine whether there are any fundamental
differences between that proceeding and the ordinary trial of a criminal
indictment which would justify so seemingly radical a departure from
our well established procedural policy in cases involving sanity of the
accused.
In the extradition hearing held in the asylum state, no attempt is
made to pass on the ultimate guilt of the accused. The only considera-
tions inquired into at such a hearing are whether or not a crime is
charged under the laws of the demanding state; whether or not the
identity of the accused is established; whether or not the accused is a
fugitive from justice, and that the demand for extradition is made in
good faith. Wilcox v. Nolze, 34 Ohio St. 520, 7 Ohio D.R. 446
(1878) ; In re Williams, 5 Ohio App. 55, 25 Ohio C.C. (N.S.) 249,
27 Ohio C.D. 385 (1915). Thus it will be seen that alleged insanity
at the time of the commission of the act will not constitute a defense,
and that question is one to be determined at the trial of the offense.
The problem raised here is the one of present insanity, or insanity at the
time of the proceeding for extradition, with the resultant inability on the
part of the accused to appreciate the rights guaranteed him under the Act.
The common method of testing the sufficiency of the extradition
proceedings is through application for a writ of habeas corpus. It is
expressly provided in the new Act (Ohio G.C. io9-IO) that the prisoner
shall be taken before a judge and informed qf the charge made against
him, and a reasonable time allowed within which he may apply for a
writ of habeas corpus. Under the former act (Ohio G.C. 114) there
was no express provision for habeas corpus, it being provided that a
person arrested in such a proceeding should, before being surrendered to
the agent of the demanding state, be brought before a judge who pro-
ceeded to hear and examine the charge. It was held, however, that the
power of the court at such a proceeding was substantially the same as in
habeas corpus. Wilcox v. Nolze, supra, In re Hampton, i Ohio N.P.
181, 2 Ohio Dec. (N.P. 579 (895). But while the extradition of
the prisoner is a criminal process, the writ of habeas corpus is not a pro-
ceeding in that process. Habeas corpus is a civil proceeding, instituted by
a party to enforce the civil right of personal liberty, whether the restraint
being exercised is civil or criminal. Henderson v. James, 52 Ohio St.
242, 39 N.E. 8o5, 27 L.R.A. 290 (895); Ex Parte Tom Tong, io8
U.S. 556, 27 L. Ed. 826, 2 Sup. Ct. Rep. 871 (1883). The action
is brought at the instance of the accused, and he is the party plaintiff.
Recognizing this distinction then, can it be said that the insanity of the
accused would materially affect the case? Ohio has adopted a legislative
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provision (Ohio Gen. Code Sec. I1247), which is common in most
states, providing that the action of an insane person must be brought by
his guardian. That this section is mandatory has been expressly held in
Reno v. Love, 25 Ohio C.C. (N.S.) 129, 26 Ohio C.D. 296, 6o Bull.
497, affirmed without opinion in 88 Ohio St. 623 (1916). The pro-
vision is only applicable, however, where the party has been adjudged
insane by proceedings instituted for that purpose, and where there has
been a guardian appointed at the time the suit is brought. 22 Ohio Jur.,
"Insane Persons," sec. 40. By section 11249 of the General Code, it is
provided that, where the plaintiff becomes insane or his insanity is dis-
covered after the action is brought, it shall be prosecuted by his guardian
or trustee appointed by the court. Section I 125I provides that where
the insanity is not manifest to the court, the question may be tried by
the court or a jury impaneled for that purpose.
As a result of the foregoing statutory provisions, the fact that the
accused is the party plaintiff, and the fact that the action is a civil pro-
ceeding, would not appear to be sufficient reasons for saying that the
insanity of the accused in an extradition proceeding is immaterial. If
these provisions are to be construed liberally, it would seem that, upon
the suggestion of insanity, it would be incumbent upon the court to
investigate the charge, and, if found to be true, appoint a trustee whose
duty it would be to aid the accused in the preparation and conduct of
his case.
CHARLES A. REYNARD
DOMESTIC RELATIONS
CONTRACTS AND QUASI-CONTRACTS OF PARENT AND CHILD
The plaintiff filed an action against the defendant, executor of his
mother's will, to recover for personal services rendered by him during
the six years immediately preceding her death. The decedent had lived
at the Hotel Alms and the plaintiff lived with his family about one mile
therefrom. The services consisted in personal attention to the mother
and in assisting her in the management of her property consisting of
about eighty thousand dollars worth of securities. The court of appeals
held (I) that the plaintiff could not recover on a quasi-contractual
theory for work and labor performed because of the close family rela-
tionship of the parties; (2) that the evidence was not of a sufficiently
high degree to warrant recovery on a contractual basis. Woods v. Fifth-
Third Union Trust Co., 54 Ohio App. 303, 6 N.E. (2d) 987 (936).
